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Part I OVERVIEW 
1 Live-Donor Organ Transplantation: 
Then and Now 
Thomas E. Starzl and Amadeo Marcos 
Department of Surgery, Thomas E. Starzl Transplantation Institute, University of Pittsburgh 
School of Medicine and Medical Center, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, US.A. 
INTRODUCTION 
The concept of live-volunteer organ donation has been controversial ever since the first such 
?peration was performed in 1953 in Paris by the team oUean Hamburger. In the much-publicized 
maugural case, a mother's kidney was transplanted to the extraperitoneal pelvic location of her 
non Immunosuppressed son. The allograft functioned for three weeks before being rejected (1). 
The recipient operation, which had been developed by Rene Kuss (2), was essentially the same 
procedure as that employed for the historical identical twin cases of Murray and Merrill (3) and 
up to the present day. The donor operation also has changed only in its details. 
DUring the ensuing 20 years (1953-1973), the conceptual framework of clinical renal trans-
plantation that exists today was put in place in a succession of steps. The first of these steps (4) 
was largely dependent on kidney donation by live volunteers. In fact, it is unlikely that the 
modern era of kidney and other kinds of organ transplantation could have evolved as it did 
between 1953 and 1970 without the observations and advances made possible by the use of 
t~ese early live donors. The reason was that organs from deceased donors during most of this 
t~e Could be obtained only after cessation of heart beat and respiration. The clinical results 
usmg the ischemically compromised grafts were so poor and the clinical observations were so 
WIdely variahle that deceased-donor organ transplantation had come to an impasse, both as 
treatment an~ as an instrument of discovery. 
. The practice of live donation was no secret and aroused surprisingly little negative reac-
~on from the public. However, live donation was, from the beginning, an intractably divisive 
Issue Within the medical profession because it potentially placed healthy persons in harm's way 
a~d; therefore, appeared to violate the deep-rooted physician's tradition of primum non nocere 
(fmt, do no harm). Before support for live kidney donation could be solicited from religious 
lead~rsI government agencies, and ultimately the public, it was essential to develop agreement 
WIthin the medical profession about the probity of this practice. 
. A kidney transplant-specific consensus was reached by the early 1970s in a series of 
ethical-medical conferences and publications (5,6) in which one of the authors of this chapter, 
Thomas E. Starzl (TES), was a foremost supporter of live donation. The seminal issue that had 
t~ be addressed was the doctor-patient relationship in which the physician assumes a specific 
kind of responsibility for the welfare of another human individual. Before the advent of trans-
plantation, the doctor-patient agreement had been entered into without regard for its social or 
?ther ramifications. Because the" contract" between doctor and patient was so simple and clean, 
It had shielded the ill from evolving philosophical, religious, and legal caprices. Historically, the 
sole beneficiary of the "medical care umbrella" was the patient. What conceivable benefit was 
there for the healthy and well-motivated live donor? 
A defensible way out was found at ethics conferences and in law courts with the argu-
ment that the fullness of the donor's emotional life and holistic welfare was very often depen-
dent on that of the recipient. This argument was particularly persuasive under circumstances of 
mtrafamilial organ transplantation. The long-term benefits to the donor could then be viewed 
as parallel, or even equivalent, to those of the recipient. Acceptance of this concept was a great 
relIef to renal transplant surgeons whose early contributions to the new field had been so heavily 
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dependent on live donors. The work up and care of these donors had been provided exclusively 
by the recipient team (7), which also assumed a long-term responsibility for their follow-up. 
Bv the time consensus was reached, two important events had improved the prospects for 
kidney~transplantationK The first was acceptance in the late 1960s of the concept of brain death. 
This resulted in the immediate availability of better kidneys and other organs from dead but 
heart-beating donors. Second, the federally mandated end-stage renal disease (ESRD) amend-
ment to the U.S. Social Security act of 1972, and similar legislation in several European countries, 
provided fiscal support for organ procurement from heart-beating deceased donors. 
The American ESRD legislation caused an additional sea change. It also bolstered live 
kidney donation by underwriting for the first time the cost of work-up and operative care of the 
volunteer patients. A predictable effect of the federal financial incentive was peripheralization 
of the work up and other aspects of donor care. For example, kidney recipients and their donors 
frequently were referred from outlying hospitals as a pair, usually with a donor renal angio-
gram in hand. Now, the question arose whether the resulting division of responsibility for 
donor welfare could erode protection of these volunteers from coercion or even undermine 
safety standards of work up. At first, such concerns were minimal in Europe because live kidney 
donation was employed uncommonly, if at all, in most programs. 
In the United States, where live donation had become widespread, it became difficult in 
some cases to identify who was looking after the donors' welfare. In the programs directed by 
one of the authors (TES) at the Universities of Colorado (until 1980) and Pittsburgh (1980-1992), 
live-donor kidney transplantation remained continuously available, but with the understanding 
that faculty and staff with ethical qualms could opt out of the performance of the donor opera-
tions. The consequence of this policy in Denver and Pittsburgh was the concentration of surgical 
experience by a subset of the total team. However, all members of the team were expected to 
participate in the event of complications. As before, the commitment to the donor as it related 
to complications from nephrectomy was construed to be for a lifetime. : . 
The team leader of the Colorado and Pittsburgh programs (TES) discontinued participa-
tion in these operations in 1972 after a vascular accident during the work up of a donor in a 
referring hospital resulted in a foot amputation. Anxiety generated by this case was com-
pounded by donor deaths at other centers, most of which were never formally reported. In fact, 
donor deaths occurring during work up (e.g., due to angiography complications), or from late 
complications of donor nephrectomy (e.g., intestinal obstruction) have never been included in 
donor mortality compilations. For the record, there have been no known deaths related to donor 
nephrectomy in either the Colorado or Pittsburgh experience; but because of incomplete late 
follow-up in some cases, a clean slate cannot be claimed with certainty. 
THE HELSINKI DEBATE: LIVE ORGAN DONATION CIRCA 1986 
The shifting ground of live kidney donation was evident in a formal debate at the 11th Congress 
of the International Transplantation Society, convened in Helsinki, Finland, in the waning days 
of August 1986. The program committee assigned Felix Rapaport the task of defending the pro-
cedure, with one of the authors (TES) as the designated opponent. Rapaport began by describing 
how scientific and medical advances had resulted in changed guidelines for live donation. The 
inference was that both the ethical issues and practical policies of live donation were moving 
targets, and that positions taken in 1986 would very likely be viewed as obsolete 20 years hence. 
Like a document in a time capsule, the debate was preserved in the pages of the journaL 
Transplantation Proceedings (8,9). Now that the 20 years have passed, Rapaport's prophecies 
have come to pass. His primary justification for live kidney donation in 1986 was an eminently 
practical one: i.e., the rapidly growing unmet need for transplantable kidneys. Rapaport associ-
ated the shortfall with the improved survival and better quality of life with the advent of cyclo-
sporine, and predicted that further refinements in immunosuppression would only increase the 
demand. He emphasized the safety of renal donation (citing estimates of one death per 2000 
cases). Looking forward, he predicted that future strategies to induce tolerance would be fully 
applicable only under the circumstances of live donation: i.e., sufficient time for pretransplant 
recipient immune modulation. 
The centerpiece argument by TES against live donation was concerned with the physical 
and emotional health risk to the donor under the increasingly commercial circumstances of the 
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emerging field. The risk already had been demonstrated by extensive experience: e.g., there had 
been 20 known deaths of kidney donors. A secondary concern was the difficulty of ruling out 
the psychological or economic coercion of donors. Finally the possibility was raised that the 
convenience of performing prescheduled transplant operations could dampen enthusiasm, or 
even be a negative incentive, for deceased donor organ procurement. All of these issues con-
tinue to concern us today. 
What was remarkable about the pro and con positions of 1986, however, was not the 
divergence but rather the commonality of the two points of view. There was concurrence that 
living donors provide better grafts, better biologic matches, and a higher quality of recipient life 
than can be achieved with deceased donors. Moreover, TES was even more specific than 
Rapaport in suggesting how live-donor blood products in advance of the kidney transplanta-
tion could be used to facilitate tolerance. The nonconfrontational nature of the debate was 
reflected in the final statements of the two presenters. 
From the con perspective, it was stated that 
... No one would ever operate on a living donor without being convinced in his deepest conscience 
that he or she was doing the right thing. What we do when we agree to engage in public discussions 
like this is to expose the deepest crevices of our consciences for criticism and sometimes ridicule. Thus, 
I want to conclude by honoring Felix Rapaport for corning here as he has done today to give his views 
about a decision that must be between the surgeon and the living donor, and between them alone (7). 
In his pro summary, Rapaport recapitulated his conviction that even with 100% retrieval 
of all deceased donor kidneys potentially available in 1986 in the United States, there would be 
a shortage of grafts, with many deaths of recipients who otherwise could have returned to a 
useful place in society. He concluded: 
This consideration raises the very real question as to whether the continuing resistance to living-
donor kidney transplantation is ethically or medically justifiable today. The time may well have corne 
for us to determine ... whether ... to advance the policy of preserving life, or to stand paralyzed by 
its taboos (8). 
If tl)ere was an ethical divide between the 1986 Helsinki debaters, it was because the focus 
on one side (TES) was almost entirely on a perceived erosion of donor safety. On the other side, 
Rapaport's defense of live donation went well beyond the original "mutual donor-recipient 
benefit" argument, about which consensus had been achieved a decade earlier. Rapaport's posi-
tion was that live kidney donation would be necessary to prevent pivotal societal problems, 
including the breakdown of the national ESRD program, which already was heavily weighted 
by transplant candidates on long-term dialysis who were vainly waiting for grafts. Moreover, 
the fiscal viability of many transplant centers depended on live donor organs. In Rapaport's 
view, the failure to exploit live donation would result in closure of these programs and thereby 
inhibit the homogeneous diffusion of renal transplantation into the national health care system. 
From the perspective of "group ethics," the death of one volunteer per 2000 donations was a 
statistical nonevent relative to the life years saved. 
It is noteworthy that neither of the Helsinki debaters ever published again on the subject 
of live donation and that both scrupulously avoided public expressions of opinion. It was not 
merely a matter of mutual respect. There was really no right or wrong answer. In the 1990s, and 
for reasons he never explained, Rapaport opted out of personal participation in live donor cases 
at his own institution. 
LIVE ORGAN DONATION 2006 
History's judgment on the ethics of live donor organ transplantation probably will not be final-
ized for many more years. The ultimate verdict is apt to be harsh if genuinely effective alterna-
tive methods of treating organ failure such as, artificial organs, xenotransplantation, or stem 
cell-based strategies are developed. For the time being, however, live organ donation is an 
ethical fait accompli, including at the Universities of Colorado and Pittsburgh, for precisely the 
reason given by Rapaport. Because of the decreasing availability of deceased donor kidneys, 
live kidney donation has increased in Pittsburgh over the last 15 years to about the same extent 
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as that nationally. Moreover, the trail blazed by live donation of the kidney has expanded in 
selected centers throughout the world to all of the other transplantable organs except the heart. 
Living donation of organs other than the kidney was mentioned only once in the 1986 
Helsinki debate, and then with the unchallenged expression of hope that 
... more complex donor operations such as partial pancreas removal or removal of portions of the 
liver for transplantation will not be extensively carried out in living volunteers since here the risk to 
the donor will be even greater (9). 
The increased risk is best exemplified by the worldwide experience with live-donor liver 
transplantation (LDLT). 
Support for LDLT in the United States and Europe was built on the socia-ethical base 
constructed by regulatory and oversight committees at the University of Chicago, where dis-
cussions were initiated at the urging of the surgeon, Christopher Broelsch (10). The first cases of 
the Chicago LDLT series were reported to the American Surgical Association in 1990 with a 
generally benign discussion from the floor (11). From the beginning, however, it was estimated 
that the mortality with these procedures would be approximately one in every 200-250 cases. 
Based on the world's known experience of nearly 6000 LDLTs, the prophecy has proved to be 
accurate, or possibly even an underestimate because some deaths have not been reported and 
very few have been described in detail (12). Nevertheless, it is clear that the mortality rate to 
date has been 10 or 15 times greater than that of kidney donation. Most of these losses attracted 
minimal public attention. However, some set off a frenzy of media attention and subsequent 
recriminations directed at specific institutions and individuals. . 
Recognizing that these incidents had brought LDLT to the brink of peer- a~d/ or societal-
imposed abandonment, liver transplant surgeons and hepatologists have taken determined 
steps to assure complete reporting of such cases to an audited registry of donor as well as 
recipient outcomes. It is hoped that analyses of these data will provide answers about risks and 
also clarify important unresolved issues (e.g., what are the relative merits of the right- and left-
liver lobe operations?). Moreover, at meetings of registry participants such as the summit 
conference convened in Vancouver, Canada, on September 15th-16th, 2006, measures to increase 
donor safety could be discussed in a collegial and nonjudgrnental manner. The procedure with 
the highest mortality has been removal of the right lobe. 
In contrast to the multicenter case collection, right lobe donation has been safe and effec-
tive in single-center or single-surgeon series. For example, between 1998 and date, one of the 
authors, Amadeo Marcos (AM), performed 307 live donor liver operations at three successive 
university centers (Commonwealth University of Virginia, University of Rochester, and the 
University of Pittsburgh). In 289 (94%) of the cases, the right lobe was used. The incidence of 
early or late donor death, hepatic failure, or aborted operation was zero. This experience is 
described in Chapter 16. Here, we are concerned, first, with the influence on donor safety of 
recipient case selection; and second, with the ethical ramifications of the donor and recipient 
screening policies. 
The donors in the single-surgeon series described in Chapter 16 were surrounded from the 
beginning with a highly protective ring against coercion, emotional damage, and technical or 
management errors. Unlike the diffusion of donor responsibility that took place 30 years ago in 
kidney transplantation, all liver donors in our program must be worked up and cared for at our 
transplant center. As the personal experience and that acquired in other LDLT centers was com-
piled, layers of security were added: for example, a pretransplant liver-needle biopsy has been 
an obligatory condition for donation. In addition, a constant element throughout the acquisition 
of this experience was the exclusion from LDLT candidacy of recipients whose chronic end-stage 
hepatic failure was unstable and of patients who had fulminant hepatic failure. 
We believe that this restrictive policy is a key factor in avoidance of live donor mishaps. 
The urgency of donor work up for a recipient who is unstable may lead to errors of commission 
or omission. Urgent circumstances also can result in the performance of a futile donor operation, 
as has been exemplified by the experience reported by Broelsch et al., (13) from Essen, Germany. 
In the German experience, four recipients died intraoperatively after the donor operation had 
reached the stage of liver division into right and left lobes including transaction of the hilar 
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ducts ("Jzepar divisum/l). Although the right lobes could be left in place after biliary reconstruc-
tion (two duct-to-duct, two hepaticojejunostomy), three of the four donors had Significant early 
complications from the right lobe, and one of the three had a bout of septic cholangitis at 
43 months that was relieved by dilatation of an anastomotic stricture. 
Because unstable recipient disease can convert a meticulously-planned donor operation 
into a shamble, our opinion is that volunteer liver donation is an operation that should be used 
electively to treat patients who are not terminally ill. It could be argued that this policy is based 
on a medical-ethical syllogism. Even though their life may be miserable, most patients with 
stable end-stage liver disease have a survival prognosis of many months or even years. 
Therefore, it can be argued that the preferential target population for an organ allograft should 
theoretically be the one in which early deaths are most likely. This is, in fact, the basis for the 
UNOS deceased donor liver allocation system with which we are in unequivocal agreement. 
However, LDLT requires a very different set of decisions across the full spectrum of health 
care stakeholders because it involves a double relationship for the doctor: with the donor as 
well as that with the recipient. Elective LDLT to a nonurgent recipient ostensibly is at odds with 
the" sickest first" philosophy behind the UNOS deceased donor liver allocation policy, but it is 
consistent with two higher priorities. First, it improves the safety of donor care as described 
above. Second, it meets the standard of long-term holistic health and welfare benefit for the 
donor with which live donor kidney transplantation was justified in the 1960s (see earlier). It is 
well known that grave illness is the single most negative recipient survival factor with liver 
transplantation. There is no way to assess the despair caused by a futile LDLT, or for that matter, 
by a failed live organ donation of any kind. Avoidance of this disillusioning outcome begins 
with recipient case selection. 
As discussed earlier, Rapaport considered the benefits of a successful live organ donation 
in a larger context than that of the welfare of a specific donor and of a specific recipient. He envi-
sioned the looming nightmare of a half-million patients waiting on dialysis. Because chronic arti-
ficial-liver support technology does not exist, waiting lists ofliver transplant candidates inevitably 
will be kept small in the foreseeable future by II deaths while waiting." However, from Rapaport's 
"group ethics", viewpoint, the domino benefits of LDLT could relieve the overall liver graft 
shortage, prevent slippage of liver transplant candidates from elective into the grave disease 
categories, and assure a higher rate of return of recipients to a genuinely functional role in 
society. 
A WILD CARD: PRETRANSPLANT IMMUNE MODULATION 
Until recently, much of the progress in organ transplantation has depended on the development 
of increasingly potent immunosuppressants. Following the discovery in 1992 of donor leuko-
cyte microchimerism in long surviving kidney, liver, and other kinds of human organ recipients 
(14,15), the leukocyte-chimerism-associated mechanisms were elucidated that directly linked 
organ and bone marrow cell engraftment, and eventually clarified the meaning of acquired 
transplantation tolerance (16,17). The resulting paradigm shift mandated revisions of many 
cherished dogmas, revealing how immunosuppression could be better timed and dosed, and 
suggested ways to effectively prepare recipients for organ transplantation by exposing them to 
donor leukocytes prior to arrival of the organ graft. 
The foregoing insight was not fully developed until almost two decades after the 1986 
Congress of the Transplantation Society. However, both participants in the Helsinki debate 
recognized that there would be sufficient time for the pretransplant recipient immunomodula-
tion only under the circumstances of live donor transplantation. Consequently, both men 
emphasized that the incentive for live donor organ transplantation would be ratcheted up once 
the principles of effective immunosuppression-aided tolerance induction were delineated and 
exploited. The objective of efficient tolerance induction was ultimately accomplished in 2005 in 
patients undergoing LDLT with a protocol that can be generalized for transplantation of all 
kinds of organs. Immunosuppression is begun three weeks before organ transplantation, 
followed by an infusion of precursor and stem cell-enriched donor leukocytes. The organ trans-
plantation subsequently is carried out in a patient who already is well on the way to a donor-
specific tolerant state. 
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Preliminary results of the first five cases of LDLT were presented by one of us (AM) at an 
international conference in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, on March 11, 2006. The follow-ups are still 
too short to know whether this precise protocol is a definitive end to the search for the Holy Grail 
of organ tolerance or is only another step toward this objective. However, it is already clear that a 
high degree of at least partial tolerance can be reliably produced. This has opened a horizon for the 
more efficient use of the most precious resource of ail, namely the allograft taken from a live volun-
teer donor. To avoid tragedies involving live donors, no matter of what organ, it will be necessary 
to heed those technical, management, and ethical lessons about live donation that have been 
learned in the past from bitter experience. A gold rush is gratifying only if the gold is not sullied. 
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